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Differential games in which one or both players are restricted to choosing 
control functions which are uniformly Lipschitz continuous and which start at 
fixed initial conditions always have a value. We derive the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation which this value satisfies a.e. as a function of the initial time t, the initial 
state x, and the initial control positions. We also show that a “Lipschitz Game” 
has an approximate saddle point in pure strategies. The approach of Friedman 
to differential games is used. 
In Barron [l] the concept of a differential game in which one or both players are 
restricted to choosing control functions which are members of compact classes of 
uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions was introduced. Suppose VA$,, denotes 
the upper (+) and lower (-) values of such a game where the maximizer 9 
must choose from functions with Lipschitz constant M and 6, the minimizer, 
from functions with Lipschitz constantl. It was proved there that for games with 
any dynamics lim,,, lim,,, V& = lim,,, Jimfit,, V&,L is a sufficient 
condition for the game to have a value ii in the sense of Friedman [4]. For games 
with ordinary differential equations as dynamics this condition is also necessary- 
in fact, the double limit was shown to exist. 
In this paper we will further restrict our Lipschitz control functions to starting 
in some fixed control positions, say y  for 9 and z for <. Note then that V$I,$ 
becomes a function, Vz~,~(t, X, y, z), of th e initial time t, the initial state x of the 
dynamics and the initial control positions y  and z. Clearly, in the case when the 
controls are allowed to choose any measurable functions this restriction on the. 
control positions is irreIevant because in this case a player can instantaneously 
jump to another point in the control set. 
When the controls are restricted as above with fixed initial positions and fixed 
Lipschitz constants the distinction between which player makes the first move 
(with a resulting information advantage to the other player) becomes nonexistent, 
This is due mainly to the fact that each player’s maneuverability is limited and 
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also to the fact that once a player receives some information about this opponent’s 
current position and his Lipschitz constant he can then calculate with reasonable 
accuracy his opponent’s future position (exactly corresponding to a realistic 
situation: once I know the rate at which you run and where you are now I can 
figure out your maximum range over a time interval). Thus, it is obvious that we 
should have Jr+ M,L(t, X, y, 3) = I;“G,~(~, X, y, a), i.e., that “Lipschitz value” will 
always exist even for nonlinear dynamics and in the absence of an Isaacs’ minimax 
condition. This is not true when measurable controls are allowed. In fact, a value 
will exist without the Isaacs’ condition even when only one of the players is 
restricted to playing Lipschitz controls from a fixed position-a somewhat sur- 
prising fact. 
To determine a computational method of determining VL’*L(t, X, y, a) = 
V$,L(t, X, y, Z) we look for the Hamilton-Jacobi equation that this function 
should satisfy almost everywhere. Some formal calculations indicate that this 
equation should be 
for the game with dynamics g = f(~, 4, q, 0, t(t) = X, v(t) = y, c(t) = x, and 
payoff f’(q 5) = g(t( T)) + Jf h(s, E, ?I, 0 ds. When only one player, say T, 
plays Lipschitz (Al) and 5 plays measurable with values in 2, the value function 
PW(t, X, y) satisfies a.e. 
Obviously these equations are no easier to solve than the classical Isaacs’ equation 
but the formal techniques applied there will also be applicable here and, of 
course, the classical Hamilton-Jacobi theory yields a local solution. The 
equations possess a global “generalized solution” in the sense of Friedman [7]. 
For applications, the most important fact concerning Lipschitz differential 
games is that (under some regularity conditions) there exists a pair of functions 
7 and 1; which are solutions to a system of ordinary differential equations and 
which are near optimal to any desired degree of accuracy. Thus Lipschitz games 
possess the property of having an (approximate) saddle point in strategies which 
are given as solutions to differential equations and can be computed (at least 
numerically). Measurable games, in general, do not have this property. Formally, 
one can expect from [l], however, that with large Lipschitz constants we can 
approximate the measurable case fairly well. 
In Section 1 we precisely define the situation and present some preliminary 
lemmas. 
In Section 2 we formulate the Lipschitz games as equivalent mnsurabZe games. 
This allows us to apply the results proved concerning these games by Friedman 
[4-61, Fleming [3], Elliott and Kalton [2], etc. 
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In Section 3 we use the machinery built up in Sections 1 and 2 and the results 
of Friedman [4, 61 to establish the existence of value for each M, L and to prove 
that the value satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We have also included 
some results when only one player chooses Lipschitz. 
In Section 4 we prove our results on saddle points in pure strategies. 
Robert Jensen in a paper to appear in TFans. Amer. Math. Sot. is considering 
the case when the dynamics are Ito differential equations and the Lipschitz 
controls include a perturbation by a Brownian motion. 
1. BASIC DEFINITIONS FOR LIPSCHITZ DIFFERENTIAL GAMES AXD 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
For any positive integer nz, we denote Euclidean m-space by R”’ and the norm 
in@byi.\, 
Let p, 2 be given positive integers and let Y C RP, and 2 C RQ be fixed compact, 
convex sets, called the control sets. Let T be a fixed positive real number. 
We are given functionsf: [0, r] x R” x k’ x Z + R”, A: [0, T] x Rni >: 
Y x Z + R1 and g: R”’ --f RI. We assume throughout this paper the following 
conditions on these functions: 
(A) f(t, X, y, z) and h(t, X, y, X) are bounded and satisfy a uniform 
Lipschitz condition in (t, X, y, z) f  [0, T] x R” x I-’ x 2. 
(B) g(a) is a bounded and continuous function in x E RB7. 
Remark. These conditions on f, h, g can be weakened somewhat so that the 
functions satisfy growth conditions and local Lipschitz conditions. 
Consider the system of m ordinary differential equations: 
with initial conditions 
E(t) = x. (1.2) 
Given any pair of measurable functions q = T(T), f  = {(T) on 0 < t < 7 < T 
with values in Y and Z, respectively, if we substitute these functions (called 
control functiom) into (1. l), the system (l.l), (1.2) has a unique absolutely 
continuous solution 6 = [(T) on [t, Tj satisfying (1.1) almost everywhere. We 
also call 5 the trajectmy corresponding to (v, i). 
Consider the payoff functional: 
WI, 5) = g(t(T)) + ST Ns, E(s), T(S), 5(s)) ds. 
t 
(1.3) 
164 EMMANUEL NICHOLAS BARRON 
For any pair of control functions (7, t;), with 5 as the corresponding trajectory 
P(v, 5) is well defined. 
We will briefly describe the notion of a Lipschitz differential game associated 
with (l.l)-(1.3). See B arron [I] for more details and certain results concerning 
these games. 
Let J be any subinterval of [0, T] and let AI, L be given positive constants. 
,Let Jt denote [t, TJ. For any sets A C Rfl, B C Rq, let 
and 
YYJ; 4 = h(T): J- .f4 I 7(T) = M+-, 7*(T)), 
I 7i(d - %(T’)l < M I ?- - 7’ I 
for all 7, 7-’ E J, i = 1, 2 ,..., p} 
Z”(J; B) = -X(T): J-B I C(T) = G(4..., 5q(4), 
I L(T) - ciw <L I T - 7‘ I 
for all 7, 7’ E J, j = 1, 2 ,..., 4). 
For fixed t E [0, T], y  E A, z E B, let 
and 
Y,“(P, 4; -4) = b?(T) E YYP, 4; -41 7(t) = Y) 
Z’([t, 4; B) = MT) 6 ZL(P, 4; B)I C(t) = 4 
where t < a < T. 
Given a positive integer n, partition [t, T] into’n subintervals of equal length 
6 = (T - t)/n: 
I, = [t, %I, Ij = Lsj-l 3 sjl, 6,=t+j-6, 1 <j<fz, 
6, = t, 6, = T. (1.4) 
For any sets A C R”, B _C Rq, let Aj , Bj (1 < j < TZ) denote the classes of 
measurable functions defined on Ij with values almost everywhere in A, B, 
respectively. Given y  E A, x E B, let YE E Y,I”(II ; A), Yj” E Ynf(Ii ; A), 
Z& = ZzL(l; ; B), and ZjL E .ZL(lj ; B)(2 < j < n). 
For 1 < j ,< n, MP,j, LAS,? are any maps: 
MI’“‘j: B, X Yly X B, X Yi M x ... X Bj-,l x I’jf!l X Bj + Yj M; 
LA”,‘: A, x Zts x A, x ZzL x ... x Ajel x Zkl x 9i + ZjL. 
Let l”‘r,,, and LA,,, 
. . 
denote any functions m Ytz and Z& , respectively. For 
2 < j < fz, let “‘r,,,. and LA,,, be maps: 
“I’s,j: YE X B, X Y2M X B, X *.. X If,?1 X Bj-14 Yj”; 
“A.+ Z,“? x A, x ZzL x A, x .-. x Zj”-1 x Aj, + Z?“. 
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Let .P = (.P), r, = (r,&, ds = (,P*j), and 8, = (d,,j) for 1 <j < n 
denote upper and lower S-strategies, respectively, for 77 and c, as defined in 
Friedman [4]. For example, P,j: B, x d, x *.. x Bj-1 x Aj-1 x Bj ---t Aj (1 < 
j < n). These S-strategies map into measurable functions. 
Given any LA, or lower s-strategy A, for 5 and a vector .‘-‘P for 17 we can 
uniquely construct control functions as in Friedman [4]. Similarly, given any “r, 
or lower s-strategy I’, for +q and a vector LAs for 5 we can construct control 
functions. Thecontrol functions thus constructed are called the outcome of the pair. 
Denote the outcome of (d, , M.P) by (Z;, , T&) and the outcome of (“r, , P) 
by (qMs , 5”). Similarly, denote the outcome of (Ld, , P) by (I,, i vs) and that of 
P8 I L4 b- h8 I 5L6). 
DEFINITION. The vectors MITB and Ld8 are called Lipschitx upper S-strategies 
if the functions qM”(~) E Y,,,“(Jt ;’ A) and cL6(r) E ZrL(Jt ; B) when played 
against any lower a-strategy. The vectors “r, and LA, are called Lipschitz lowe? 
6-stuute@s if the functions T&T) E YUM(Jt ; ,4) and 1[L6(~) E ZzL(Jt ; B) when 
played against any upper. a-strategy. 
Thus, for example, given a Lipschitz lower S-strategy &d, for 5 and a Lipschitz 
upper s-strategy MP for 7, let (CL6 , 771bf8) denote the outcome. Then q,,” E Y?;&f 
and CL8 E ZzL on the entire interval Jt . 
Throughout this paper the symbols MP, “‘r, , L4s, L4, will denote Lipschitz 
s-strategies. We also will write somewhat imprecisely MP E Y,““(J+ ; A), L/l6 E 
ZzLUt ; B), etc. 
DEFINITION. Take A = Y, B = 2. Any &game associated with (l.l)-(1.3) 
such that either player must choose a Lipschitz S-strategy is called a Lipschitz 
a-game. 
See Friedman [4,6] for the definition of a a-game. See also Barron [l] for more 
details concerning Lipschitz &games. 
Define the Lipschitz upper S-values by 
V,“(t, x, ,z) = inf sup PLLa, , Pj. 
=A8 l-’ 
We have indicated the dependence of these numbers on the initial time t E [O, T], 
the initial state x E R’“, and the initial control positions y  E Y and z E Z. 
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Similarly, define the Lipschitz lower S-values by 
and 
We easily see that all the infiniums and supremums in the above can be inter- 
changed (cf. [4, Theorems 1.4.1, 1.421). 
We next will extend the definitions of the S-values to all of I@ and Rq spaces in 
the following way: 
Let 7ry : Ii?’ + Y be the projection in Rg onto the compact, convex set Y and 
let ?T~ : R*+ 2 be the projection in Rq onto the compact, convex set 2. Then, it is 
known (see, for example, [S]) that a projection onto a closed convex set is non- 
expansive (i.e., satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition with Lipschitz constant I). 
Hence mr and rz are nonexpansive. 
Given y E RP, z E Rq, let y” = ~7~ y and 2 = rrzx. Then jj E Y and x” E 2. Let 
j~[0,T’JxR~~xR”xRq---fR’~ and h:[O,T]xRFn~RpxRq+R1 be 
defined by 
and 
f (t, 4 y, z) = f(t7 x, y, 2:) (1.5) 
h(t, x,y, x) = h(t, x,J, 2). (1.6) 
Then, f, h are extensions off, h and we have immediately from the nonexpan- 
siveness of q and rrz : 
LEMMA 1.1. The condition (A) holds for f,  h zuith the same Lipschitz constants 
and bozcnds asf and h, respectively. 
Extend the definition of our S-strategies so that the outcome functions take 
values in Rp (for 7) and Rq (for 4). Denote the extensions by i”p6, ““ps, Lp, and 
LJs , and their outcome controls by iiM6 , +iM6, c,, , and cLs. 
Thus, for example, with y E RP and z E Rq fixed, ‘Lfps, MT& E Yvhf((J, ; RP) and 
LzB, “if, E ZaL(Jt ; R”). D e ne as above the extended Lipschitz differential fi 
games associated with 
(1.7) 
at> = x7 0.8) 
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and 
Denote the Lipschitz a-values by rif,L, F8,,,f,L , Ffinr”, vBS,, and rLs, r;i,,l.. 
These S-values are defined for all y  E R”, s E RQ. Note that when q plays P or 
r, or when i plays As or A, we do foot extend; i.e., the measurable outcome of 
P, I?,, , A,, and As is required to take values in Y or Z. 
LEMMA 1.2. We have for each t E [0, Tj, x E R’“, y  E Y, z E 2, andall > 0 
6) ~&tt, fi, Y, 4 = ~f,Jt, x, y, 4, 
(ii) F&(t, x, y) = Vif(t, x, y), 
(iii) Fi(t, 5, x) = J’i(t, -T, x). 
A similar statement holds for lower Lipschitz S-values. 
Proof. We will only prove (i); the others being similar though easier. 
Write ZzL = Z,L(J, ; Z), Z,L = ZSL(Jt ; RQ), Yq” = Y,“(Ji ; Y), and 
TM Y = Y;bf(Jt ; Rp). 
We are trying to prove that if y  E Y, x E Z 
T$,,(t, x, y, z) = inf sup P[“& , 3=] 
=ii&L MF%Y,” 
(1.10) 
= inf sup PLLAs, 
=Ase Z,= MT% YAM 
5+] = V$,,(t, x, y, x). 
Obviously 
Given E > 0, it is clear that there is a Lipschitz upper a-strategy fifp8 E TV‘,” 
for v  such that 
cf,,(t, x, y, 4 d mL, MF&)l + E 
for every control C,(T) E ZzL. 
(1.12) 
Given any CL(~) E Z$ define hfF8([L) E Yydr as follows. 
Let ij,,“( 7) 3 “&&)(r) and then 
-q‘$(T) = MP6(lJ(T) = 7+j&f6(T). (1.13) 
Let P(T) be the trajectory corresponding to (& , +jIVF)(i.e., the solution of (1.7), 
(1.8)) and Iet C”(T) be the solution of (l.l), (1.2) corresponding to (cr., qnrs). 
Note that qnls(t) = q>,“(t) = y  E Y, t,,(t) = x E Z, and p(t) = P(t) = x’. 
168 EMMANUEL NICHOLAS BARRON 
By (1.5) and (1.13) we have on 0 ,< t < T < T 
so a( T) also satisfies (1. l), (1.2) with controls (5, , viMs). Since t*(~) is the unique 
solution we have shown that 
B(T) = (“(7) (0 < t < 7 < T). (1.14) 
By (1.6), (1.13), (1.14) we have by the definitions (1.3) and (1.9) 
&GA Ll = &S(T)) + l= h(s, i?(s), ~~~(4, L(s)) ds 
= g(W)> + 6 &, E”(s)> rl&, C-L(~) ds 
= P(7M6> 5L). 
Using (1.12) we see that 
(1.15) 
for every CL E Z,L = ZZZ(Jt ; 2). Thus 
(1.16) 
On the other hand, there is a Lipschitz lower s-strategy L& for 5 such that 
Ef,,(t, x, y, 4 3 q”o’,(,M)Y 7.d - E (1.17) 
for every control ~~(7) E Y,“’ = YTtW(Jt ; Y). 
Given any 7,M(~) E Yv” define “o”, E ZZL by 
L(d = L&7M)(d and Z,,(T) f  L43(7‘bJ(d = d-Ld4 E ZzL- 
As above we show that if P(T) is the solution of (1.7), (1.8) for (&, , v,~) and 
,$a(~) is the solution of (1 .I), (1.2) for (CL8 , qM), then p(r) = P(T) and 
JT7M > L) = P(7M, SL6). 
Hence, by (1.17) we have 
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for every Q, E I’;‘1 = Y,“‘(J, ; Y). Thus 
Combining (I. 16) and (1.18) and using the arbitrariness of E yields (1 j. 
Remark. Lemma 1.2 states that if the initial control positions start in the 
control sets Y, 2 then we can restrict ourselves in computing v-f,,, , F.Ws, and 
FLE (along with the lower S-values) to S-strategies with outcome functions 
remaining in the control sets for all 0 < t < 7 ,( T. 
2. THE EQUIVALENT DIFFERENTIAL GAME 
Consider the system of m + p + 4 ordinary differential equations for the 
functions (E(7), q(7), C(T)) 
@/dr = f  h &), ‘ii(7.h hjh (2.1) 
dijjdT = U(T), (2.2) 
dc/dr = V(T), (7.3) 
on 0 < t < 7 < T, with initial conditions 
f(t) = x E Rn”‘, q(t) = y E RP, c(t) = z E RQ. (2.4) 
Here, u and ZI are any measurable functions with values almost everywhere in 
and 
?Z = (u = (111 , 212 ,...) u,)ERP/]t+;+W,i=l,2 ,..., p) (2.5) 
V = {V = (5~~ , ‘~2 ,..., Dam) E R’ / ( Z’j / < L, j = I, 2 ,..., 41, 
respectively. 
(2.6) 
Consider the (measurable) differential game as defined in Friedman [4] assc- 
ciated with the system (2.1)-(2.6) and payoff 
Here the players are u and V; u is the maximizer and 7: is the minimizer. Xote that 
the payoff (2.7) is explicitly independent of u, e’. 
Denote the S-strategies for this game for the partition (1.4) of [t, 77 by aps, 
Q6‘ (for U) and ly”, !PS (for u). 
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Denote by t/;“(t, x, y, z) and V&(t, x, y, z) the upper and lower S-values, 
respectively, of this game. Thus 
and 
where (Q , u”) is the outcome of a pair (ul, f  @a) and (u6 , ~9) is the outcome of a 
pair (Qs , Y). 
Consider next the differential game associated with 
d&i7 = f (7, it(~)> r1(~), C(T)> O<t<T,(T, (2.8) 
dij/dT = U(T), tw 
E(t) = x E R”‘, q(t) = y E Ii”, (2.10) 
and payoff 
I&, 5) = A&T)) + J)r Ws, i%h +X4, SW ds- 
In this game the players are u and 5, the control sets are Q? and 2. 
Denote the upper and lower &values by 
(2.11) 
and 
lqt, x, y) = sup 
06 
sup 
@8 
, 5”) 
where (& , u”) is the outcome of (A, , W) and (u, , c”) is the outcome of (@, , As). 
Note that J& , 5” are measurable control functions with values almost everywhere 
in 2. 
Finally consider the differential game associated with 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
and payoff 
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For this game, the players are 7 and z’ with control sets I/ and Y”, respectively. 
Denote the upper and lower a-values by 
and 
LEM~ 2.1. For each t E [O, T], x E Rn”, y  E RI’, z c RQ and fw each &I, 
L > 0 and all 6 = (T - t)/u > 0 we have 
(i) F,tf,L(t, x, y, 2) = vr”(t, .% ?, 4, 
(ii) VM6(t, x, y) = V,“,(t, x, y), 
(iii) YLb(t, x, x) = V&(t, x, Z). 
-4 similar statement holds for the lower &values. 
Proof of(i). Given E > 0, there is an upper a-strategy @ for u such that 
T,;6 < J,[u, @(v)] + E (2.16) 
for every control V(T) E Yf. 
Given any Lipschitz control CL(~) E Z,“(Jt ; RQ) we have that &T) E 
(d/d,> k(T) E Y-. 
Let S(r) = @(Q(7), and let (fIIs(~), fr”(7), CL](T)) denote the solution of 
(2.1)-(2.3) corresponding to 6”(T) and V(T) z &(7). 
Define the upper Lipschitz S-strategy fi’p E Y,“‘(J, ; RP) for q: 
for ever,v Q7) E ZZL(Jt ; I?@). 
Let P”(T) be the solution of (1.7), (1.8) corresponding to the outcome (& , 
&4a) of (CL , ~“I~6(&)). Then, by the above definition it is obvious that 
p(T) = z;(T), fhm = rlrw Lb) = LYT) (2.17) 
and hence 
for every cL E ZZ”(Ji ; RQ). 
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By (2.16) we then have 
for every 5; E ZzL(J, ; I?); and this implies 
J’I”(C x, y, 4 d sup inf m-L f MINI i- E 
Mi+s~YyM(.7t;RQ) &Z,=(J,;@) 
(2.19) 
= q&t, x,y, x) + B. 
Similarly we can easily see that 
qt, 3, y, x) b inf sup 
L&~Z,L(J,:R*) @Yg”(J&RP) 
(2.20) 
E a$& x,y, z) - E. 
Combining (2.19) and (2.20) yields (i). 
Similarly we prove (ii) and (iii) are true. This completes the proof of Lemma 
2.1. 
DEFINITION. Let & be the class of all lower a-strategies ly, for z’ such that for 
any upper s-strategy @” for u the 5 solution of (2.1)-(2.4) corresponding to the 
outcome (zig , u”) of (Fa , @“) satisfies C(T) E 2 for all t < 7 < T. Let Z,a be all 
upper a-strategies Q6 for u such that for any lower s-strategy ul, for v the ;i 
solution of (2.1)-(2.4) corresponding to the outcome (v, , u*) of (U, , W) satisfies 
;i(~) E Y for all 1 < 7 < T. Similarly we define AI* (for F) and Ear (for Qis). 
We make similar definitions of Ej, , 2: and Ai”, ,$,I for the games (2.8)-(2.11) 
and (2.12)-(2.15), respectively. Thus, for example, 
,Z’,“, = {W for u j V d, for 5, if (is , u”) is the outcome of (d, , @*) the +j solution of 
(2.8)-(2.10) satisfies ;i(~) E Y for all t < 7 < Tj. 
LEMMA 2.2. For each t E [0, T], x E R”, y  E Y, and z E Z andfor all 6 > 0 
(9 Ti,Yt, 3, y, 4 = i&,+4’ sq-w,,q JP8 , @I, 
(ii) G<t, x, y) = in& ww,z;I JllP0, , @“I, 
(iii) VfII(t, x, z) = infy&J sup+ J&yIs , F]. 
A similar statement holds for the lower S-values. 
Proof of(i). Clearly since fl,’ is a subset of the set of all Y6 we have 
V/(t, X, y, ~3) < inf sup JI[ya , @“I. (2.21) 
!?+I~’ CD8 
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Given E > 0, there is an upper S-strategy C% for n such that 
for every !P8 E AJ. 
Given ly, E A,l, let (cJg , 9) denote the outcome of (U-I, f  @), and let @, ?I z8) 
denote the corresponding solution of (2.1)~(2.4). 
Consider the function nyp(r). Then, by the definition of 7~~ , it is easy to see 
that nyT(~) E YUAf(Jt ; Y). B. v  absolute continuity we have that 
exists as a measurable function on 0 < t < T & T and P(T) E%!. Refine & by 
&(vg) = z?(T)* 
Given any ‘u, , let (vs , P(r)) be the outcome of (Y8 , &), and let (8, #, [,) 
be the corresponding solution of (2.1)-(2.4). 
Then 
3(T) = y $ f iqs) ds = ?’ + q.ij+(T) - n&yt) 
= Try++). 
Hence ?(r) E Y (t < 7 < 7’) and so $6 E z;6. 
Since E6 = t6, by the definition of f  we have j(c, @, f8, [J = f  (T, zB, 
&p, G) = f  (T, B, ss, CT) so that by uniqueness of solutions we get p = p. 
Finally by the definition of A we have for every !P8 E A,J 
Combining this with (2.22) yields 
Similarly vve prove the reverse inequality, This completes the proof, the proofs of 
(ii), (iii) being similar. 
174 EMMANUEL NICHOLAS BARRON 
3. THE EXISTENCE OF LIPSCHITZ VALUE AND THE HAMILTON-JACOBI-ISAACS 
EQUATION FOR LIPSCHITZ DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
THEOREM 3.1. For all t E [0, T], x E Rm, y E R”, x E RQ, and M, L 3 0, the 
following limits exist and 
(ii) lim,,, Tb16(f, 2, y) = F**+(t, x, y) = FM-@, x, y) 
= lb,, ~&C 4 y), 
(iii) lim,+, VLS(t, 5, z) SE rL+(t, x, z) = rL-(t, x, z) 
= lim,+, Ts,&, x, 4. 
Remark. The theorem states that for a game in which one or both players are 
restricted to choosing Lipschitz functions and are further restricted to starting 
at jixed control positions, the value of the game will exist. This is true in the 
absence of the “Isaacs’ minimax condition” on the functions f and h. 
Proof of (i). By Lemma 2.1( ), t i i is enough to show that the (non-Lipschitz) 
differential game associated with (2.1)-(2.4), control sets (2.5), (2.6), and payoff 
(2.7) has upper value and lower value and that these are equal. 
But this follows immediately from the fact that the players u and v  appear 
separated in (2.1)-(2.3) and not at all explicitly in (2.7). Hence, by elementary 
theorems in differential games [4, Theorem 2.3.11 part (i) follows. 
The proofs of (ii), (iii) also follow from Lemma 2.1 and the fact that-for 
game II-the players 5 and u are separated and-for game III-the players 7 
and v  are separated. This completes the proof. 
COROLLARY3.1. Forallt~[O,T],.~~R~,y~Y,andx~Z,M,L3Othe 
following limits exist and 
(i) lim8,, qf,,@, x, Y, 4 = cf,L(4 x, y, 4 = G,& x, y, 4 
= lim,+, ~8,M,L(t, x, Y, 4, 
(ii) lh+, t’MS(t, x, y) = viw+(c I*‘, Y) = Vhf-(4 x, Y) 
E lim,,O ~c3,&, x, u), 
(iii) lim,,, VL”(t, X, x) EE Y,+(t, x, .z) = vL-(t, x, z) 
= lim,,, V&r, x, z). 
The corollary follows immediately from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 1.2. 
COROLLARY 3.2. For all t E [0, T], x E Rm, y E Y, z E Z, and M, L >, 0 
(9 r&J& x, y, 4 = T&,AC x, y, 4, 
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(ii) Fbl*(t, x, y) = VM*(~, x, y), 
(iii) VL*(t, x, z) = Vr*(t, x, Z). 
DEFINITION. Denote r&,L, V”$,=, vhf+, V,,‘,lf , V,+ by r”vL, VA”*“, pr, 
I/TIM, vfi, and W, respectivelv. These functions will be caIled Lipschitz value. 
THEOREM 3.2. (i) pWJ(t, x, y, ) t J; z sa is es a uniform Lipschitz condition ilz 
(t, x, y, x) in compact subsets of [0, T] x R” x RP X RR. 
(ii) P(t, x, y) and VL(t, x, x) satisfy a uniformLipschit.2 condition in (t, x, y) 
nnd (t, x, z), respectively, in compact subsets of {O, T] x R” x Rp and [O, T] x 
R” x Rq, respectively. 
The proofs follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 and Friedman 14, Theorem 
2.6.31. From Rademacher’s theorem it follows: 
COROLLARY 3.3. The functions pWsL, v~~f, and VL are differentiable almost 
everywhere. 
THEOREM 3.3. The functions vtfsL(t, x, y, a), F.kf(t, x, y), and vL(t, x, xj 
satisfy almost evmywhere, respectiveb, the equatimzs 
-L i / F j + h(t, x,y, z) = 0, 
id 
Also F”%“( T, N, y, z) = pbf(T, x, y) = i;T”(T, x, 2) = g(r) for all x E RI”, 
~ER~,sERQ. 
Proof of (i). By Friedman [4, Theorem 4.2.11, the value VI(t, x, yS xj = 
505/26/2-2 
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lim,,, V,6 = lim,,, V+$, of the game associated with (2.1)-(2.7) satisfies the 
equation 
+ g2 
z’i(t) + h(t, x, y, x)3 = 0 
z ; 
almost everywhere and V,(T, x, y, ,z) = g(x) for all x E RnE, y  E RP, x E RQ. 
Hence, with @ and Y as defined in (2.5), (2.6) this equation becomes 
Since, from Lemma 2.1 (i), r /JM,L(t, x, y, z) = V,(t, x, y, z), part (i) of the theorem 
follows. 
The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar and are omitted. 
4. APPROXIMATE SADDLE POINTS IN PURE STRATEGIES FOR LIPSCHITZ 
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 
We will assume in this section for simplicity thatp = 4 = 1. 
Let E > 0 be given. Let W(t, x, y, z) defined on [O, 2’1 x Rm x Rl x RI. 
be a twice continuously differentiable solution of the problem 
(4.1) 
We(T, x, y, z) = g(x). (4.2) 
Denote by (p, qE, p) the unique solution of the system of ordinary differential 
equations 
Jq- = f(T, E’, rl”, 63, O<t<r<T, (4.3) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
P(t) = x E Rm, q(t) = y E RI, p(t) = z E R1. (4.6) 
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Then by (4.3)-(4.4) ad (4.1) 
+ WzE ! --L L +yg t \ ) 4- It(T, e, ?I’, 5’) = 0. i 
Hence ~$7) = constant and so by (4.2) and (4.6) 
and the theorem follows. 
Given any C(T) s ZzL(Jt ; RR’) let [, $’ denote the solution of 
^ 
2 = f(T, f, 7i”, Z), (4.7) 
(4.8) 
Given any q(r) E V,“r(Ji ; I?‘), let [, p denote the sohtion of 
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Proof. Defineon Jt 
&T) = WT> &-1, 7iE(4, @9) + s,T &, i(s), W>, L$>> ds 
with (s, $3 as in (4.7)-(4.9). Then 
(4.14) 
Since 5 E ZzL, 1 dc/dT / < L. Using this in (4.14) we get by (4.1) 
=- LE. 
Thus, (djdT)(b(T) + L E T) > 0 so that 
b(t)+Lct<l~(T)+LeT 
or by definition of b 
w(t, x, y, z) + Let < g@(T)) + f- &, &,, 4”(s), q(s)) ds + LET 
t 
= P(q’, [) + LET. 
Thus by Theorem 4.1, 
W(t, x, y, z) = P(q, 5E) < P(7j”, 5) + L( T - t)~. 
Similarly we prove that 
W(t, x, y, z) = P(T/~, 5’) 2 &, & - &I(, - T)E 
for any V(T) E Y*M( Jt ; I?‘). 
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THEOREM 4.3. lim,,, W(t, x’, y, x) = wyt, x,y, x) for nil (t, x, y, z) E 
[O, T] x Rm x R1 x R1. 
Proof. Given E > 0, there is a lower Lipschitz S-strategy ?& for 5 such that 
p n,,&, x, y, 4 > wj> “&C~>l - 6 
for every control ;i(~) E y,“‘(J$ ; RI). Thus by Theorem 4.2 
y&p, x, y, z) 3 qff, C*) - E > P(qE, SE) - L(T - t> E - E, 
where 4~ is given by (4.7)-(4.9) with 5 = 5, and (+j’, &) is the outcome of (7j”, 
Lo’,(~)>. Here, (2E, SE) are given by (4.3)-(4.6). Letting 6 -+ 0 we have from 
Theorem 3.1 
Pyt, x, y, 2) >, P(,lc, p) - L(T - t) E - E. (4.15) 
SimiIarIy, there is a lower Lipschitz s-strategy Aff8 for q such that 
V”<t, x,y, 2) < RS, ~‘fml i- 6 
for every control c(r) E ZZL(Jt ; Rl). Thus by Theorem 4.2 
P,“(t, x, y, 2) < P(,-, , p) + E < &I’, 1’) -j- M(T - t) E + e 
where p is given by (4.10)-(4.12) with v  = ;is and (qs , p) is the outcome of 
(P, Mm-9). 
Letting 6 -+ 0 we again have by Theorem 3.1 
PJ(t, x, y, z) < P(?f, %‘) + M(T - tj E + E. (4.16) 
Combining (4.15), (4.16) yields the result in view of the arbitrariness of E. 
THEOREM 4.4. Suppose y  E Y. Then given any E(T) E ZzL(Jt ; R-‘j the fwzc+on 
?(+I-> givers in (4.7j-(4.9) satisfies T(T) E Yfor all t < r < T. A similar statement 
holdsfor p(7) in (4.10)-(4.12) $z E Z. 
Proof. We only prove the statement for 4’. 
For simplicity, we assume I’ = [0, 11. Suppose WV(f) x, 1, Z) > 0 for each 
t E [O, T], x E R”, x E RI. Then it follows from the definition of 4’ in (4.3)-(4.6) 
and the fact that F&(t, x’, 1, x) > 0 that 
q?5 5’) > %-I?“, Pj. 
But by the definition off, h we easily verify that 
&VT, $E) = m, ‘3, 
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a contradiction. Thus W&t, X, 1, Z) < 0 and so +(T) < 0 at T’S for which 
q’(~) = 1. Thus, qE(7) < 1 for all t < T < T. Similarly we prove qc(~) > 0. 
Remark. (i) I f  we do not assume Y = [0, l] we show that u&t, Y, x) + PIQt, 
X, y, Z) > 0, where u,(t, X, Z) is a vector in the normal cone to 3Y at (t, X, y, z), 
leads to a contradiction. 
The theorem states that, given the extension off and h as in this paper, the 
optimal strategies, if we start in the control sets, will remain in the control sets 
for all time. In view of Lemma 2.2, the theorem states that the constant lower 
a-strategies Y, for p and dj, for qE satisfy lu, E A&, Q6 E XBr. 
(ii) We can state comparison theorems for Lipschitz differential games as in 
Friedman [5]; then we easily prove a capturability result for nonlinear dynamics 
if the pursuer’s Lipschitz constant is greater than the evader’s Lipschitz constant 
(i.e., if the pursuer can run faster than the evader) (see [5]). 
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